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I. Introduction and Summary of Conclusions∗
A. Issues
This memorandum addresses exclusion of evidence on the grounds of the means
by which it was obtained by assessing the position taken by the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (“ICTR”), the United States, England, Canada, and France. Part II of this
memorandum gives a factual background on the ICTR statute involved in this issue. Part
III of this memorandum gives a general legal overview of the exclusion of evidence. Part
IV of this memorandum looks specifically at how varying legal systems address the issue
of exclusion of evidence. Finally, Part IV of this memorandum formulates a legal test to
apply to the ICTR.
B. Summary of Conclusions
The ICTR should adopt a legal test for exclusion of evidence that is similar to
Canada’s approach to the exclusion of evidence. The Canadian approach falls in between
the strict American exclusionary rule and the lax approach of exclusion of evidence used
by France. This approach will be a good fit for the ICTR because it will allow the judges
to apply their judicial wisdom in each individual case to determine if exclusion of
evidence is necessary. More importantly, this type of system will help ensure that a
person’s fundamental right to privacy is protected without compromising the ability of
the ICTR to prosecute war criminals.
∗

ISSUE 14: Compare and contrast the approach taken in the common law jurisdictions of USA, Canada,
Britain, the mixed jurisdictions of Israel, Scotland and South Africa and the civil code systems of France
and Belgium to the exclusion of evidence on the grounds of the means by which it was obtained. Assess
and evaluate current ICTR cases, holding, and dicta, on the exclusion of evidence (see Rule 95 of the Rules
of Procedure and Evidence). Assess and evaluate ICTY decisions on this issue. Formulate a legal test to
apply in the international criminal law jurisdictions.
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II. Factual Background
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, Rule 95 (Exclusion of certain evidence) states: “No evidence shall be
admissible if obtained by methods which cast substantial doubt on its reliability or if its
admission is antithetical to, and would seriously damage, the integrity of the
proceedings.”1
The Rwanda Tribunal Rules contains the amended version of the Yugoslavia
Tribunal Rules which is consistent with the United States exclusionary rule in criminal
proceedings involving evidence obtained outside of the United States.2 Under what has
become known as the “international silver platter doctrine,” U.S. courts will not exclude
illegally obtained evidence by foreign officers in a foreign country unless the conduct of
the foreign officials during the search and seizure “shocks the judicial conscience.”3
The Rwanda Tribunal’s exclusionary rule is intended to achieve four important
objectives: (1) to discourage human rights violations in the gathering of evidence; (2) to
exclude evidence obtained by illegal means, such as torture, for reasons of unreliability;
(3) to avoid tainting the judicial process; and (4) to protect the fundamental interests of
justice with respect to due process and the rule of law.4 At the same time this
exclusionary rule does not require that evidence gathered by human rights organizations
1

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 95, U.N. Doc.
ITR/3/REV.1 (1995). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1.]
2

1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 567
(1998). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 39.]

3

JORDAN J. PAUST, M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, SHARON A. WILLIAMS, MICHAEL SCHARF, JIMMY GURULE, &
BRUCE ZAGARIS, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 527 (2000). Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 40.]
4

MORRIS AND SCHARF, supra note 2, at 567. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 39.]
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or national authorities meet all the technical requirements of the Rwanda Tribunal Rules,
provided that the means used to obtain such evidence are not so shocking as to seriously
damage the integrity of the proceedings.5

III. General Legal Discussion of Exclusion of Evidence
A. The Search and Seizure Right to Privacy
The definition of “right to privacy” must be appreciated before examining the
search and seizure right to privacy. The “right to privacy” is not easy to define.6
Generally, the right to privacy concerns the degree to which a person is or is not “left
alone,” a person is mandated to or restricted from existing or interacting with or without
others, or a person’s identity, integrity, autonomy, intimacy, sexuality, or emotions are
interfered with against their desires.7 A different view is that notions of privacy may be
determined within the context of a particular society at a particular point in time, and that
the extent of the privacy changes with a society’s norms, values, and expectations, and
any such shifts would not negate the existence of the right to privacy.8
The right to privacy in the context of searches and seizures, as developed in
domestic and international justice systems, in its simplest form, provides that all persons

5

Id.

6

Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Autonomy, Community, and Traditions of Liberty: The Contrast of British and
American Privacy Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1398, 1401. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
54.]
7

Jed Rubenfeld, The Right to Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1989) (discussing the need for privacy
rights) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 55.]; Samuel Warren & Lois Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890) (discussing the need for privacy rights). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 56.]

8

Krotoszynski, supra note 6, at 1401-02 (referring to privacy as “a realm of individual autonomy in
recognized and accepted social contexts” that is defined in relation to a particular society at a particular
point in time”). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 54.]
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shall be free from unreasonable, arbitrary, or unlawful searches or seizures of their
persons or effects.9 Common characteristics of the various definitions of the search and
seizure privacy right include the following: a respect for the purity of the home; some
permissible limitations on the right; recognition that any interference with the right must
be reasonable and limited to the scope necessary to satisfy a legal purpose; rejection of
arbitrary and unlawful interference with privacy and free-for-all discretion to search and
seize; respect for human dignity, as privacy invasions can be degrading and can
undermine public trust; effective external supervision of law enforcement authorities;
balancing of law enforcement needs against the right to privacy; judicially independent
authorization of searches and seizures, and legally enforceable safeguards regulating the
use of police powers.10

B. Exclusion of Evidence: A Remedy for Privacy Breaches
The Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court contains a two-part
“mandatory” exclusionary rule. Article 69(7) provides:
Evidence obtained by means of a violation of this Statute or
internationally recognized human rights shall not be admissible if: (a) The
violation casts substantial doubt on the reliability of the evidence; or (b)
The admission of the evidence would be antithetical to and would
seriously damage the integrity the proceedings. 11

9

George E. Edwards, International Human Rights Law Challenges to the New International Criminal
Court: The Search and Seizure Right to Privacy, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 323, 331 (2001). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 57.]
10

Id. at 385-410. (discussing customary international law and general law). The search and seizure privacy
right is found in the law and practice of jurisdictions in all major legal systems of the world.

11

The Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/9, article
69(7). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2.]
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If either prong of this exclusionary rule is satisfied, evidence acquired through violations
of the privacy right, as an “internationally recognized human right,” may be excluded
from use against the accused at trial.12 If the prosecutor seeks to introduce evidence
obtained during a questionable search or seizure, the accused may petition the Court,
which has broad power over the nature and scope of evidence admitted at trial, to exclude
the evidence or grant another appropriate remedy.13
The International Criminal Court’s exclusionary rule mimics rules existing in
many national legal systems. For example, exclusionary rules are expressly incorporated
into national Constitutions 14 and appear elsewhere within the general and criminal laws
of other countries. For example, the French Constitutional Court ruled in 1994 that the
right of privacy is implicit in the French Constitution. International tribunals, such as the
ICTY15 and the ICTR,16 have exclusionary provisions built into their rules.
The exclusionary rule17 helps ensure that the privacy interests of suspects are
upheld, as the Court balances the competing interests of victims and the accused,

12

Id.

13

Id.; Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court—Addendum: Finalized
Draft Text of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000), at Rule 63.
14

David Banisar and Simon Davies, Global Trends in Privacy Protection: An International Survey of
Privacy, Data Protection, and Surveillance Laws and Developments, 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 1, 41 (1999). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 63.]
15

The ICTY exclusionary rule provides: “No evidence shall be admissible if obtained by methods which
cast substantial doubt on its reliability or if its admission is antithetical to, and would seriously damage, the
integrity of the proceedings.” Rules of Procedure and Evidence as Amended 30 January 1995, International
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991, Rule 95, 5th Sess., U.N. Doc.
IT/32/Rev.3/Corr.1 (1995). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3.]
16

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 95, U.N. Doc.
ITR/3/REV.1 (1995). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1.]

17

The exclusionary rule is not the only remedy theoretically available to accused persons who are victims
of unlawful searches and seizures. Remedies in some jurisdictions could include civil tort remedies against

5

discourages human rights violations in evidence-gathering, maintains the Court’s
integrity and legitimacy, and furthers the Court’s goals of educating the global population
on criminal justice issues and setting an example for States to follow in their national
criminal justice systems.18

C. State Practice as an Element of Customary International Law (Search and
Seizure Privacy Right)
(1) Duration of the Search and Seizure Privacy Right
A practice need not have been in place for centuries in order to satisfy the
duration element of a customary international law proof;19 nevertheless, the search and
seizure privacy right easily qualifies as satisfying this element. The concept of the
inviolability of the home is traceable to biblical times, for example, in the decree that
“[t]heir houses are safe from fear.”20 States have employed the search and seizure
privacy right for centuries. In the fourteenth century, England enacted laws governing
searches and forfeiture of contraband.21 In 1763, the Parliamentarian William Pitt

the offending governmental agents or private individuals; criminal prosecution of the offending
government agent or private individual; governmental sanctions of offending governmental agents; and
internal discipline within police departments for offending officers. A discussion of remedies, other than
exclusion, is beyond the scope of this memo.
18

Edwards, supra note 9, at 339. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 57.]

19

F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth., 1969 I.C.J. 3, 44 (Feb. 20) (North Sea Continental Shelf Cases) (passage
of only a short period of time is not necessarily a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary
international law, but the practice must be “both extensive and virtually uniform”) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 58.]; IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (4th ed.
1990) (discussing that no particular duration required so long as consistency and generality present).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 41.]
20

BROWNLIE, supra note 19, at 3 (discussing the concept of inviolability). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 41.]

21

Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958) (quoting 18th Century English Parliamentarian’s cries
for sanctity of the home from invasions by all, even by the King, as a “man’s home is his castle”).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 17.]
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observed the virtues of the privacy rights and the inviolability of the home.22 The Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, passed in 1791, prohibited unreasonable
searches and seizures and called for search warrants based on probable cause.23
In the twentieth century, numerous international instruments maintain the search
and seizure privacy right. These instruments include the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (“UDHR”), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”),
the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”), and other international
instruments that articulate the right to privacy in family, home and correspondence.24 In
addition, some aspect of the right to privacy can be found in nearly every constitution of
the world, and into the general laws and jurisprudence of those countries without written
constitutions.25 Both civil law and common law systems boast incorporation of the right,
though the right may be construed differently in each of the two systems.26
(2) Uniformity and Consistency of the Search and Seizure Privacy Right
The second element of customary international law is that a showing of
substantial uniformity and consistency must be shown.27 The search and seizure privacy
22

Id. at 307 (discussing that though the English Parliamentarian Pitt decried the Crown’s uninvited entry
into the shabby homes of the poor, his words can apply equally to rights of alleged perpetrators of war
crimes).

23

U.S. CONST., amend. IV. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 4.]

24

See generally Edwards, supra note 9, at 368-400 (discussing the right to privacy provided for in UDHR,
ICCPR, ECHR, and other long-standing international and regional human rights instruments and in
jurisprudence of international tribunals). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 57.]

25

Id. at 385-405 (discussing the right to privacy in relation to world constitutions).

26

Id. at 391 (discussing that in civil law systems where the search and seizure protections are deemed more
procedural than substantive, the concept does not offer the substantive standard (for example, probable
cause) that is applied in common law jurisdictions. However, this interpretation distinction should not
detract from the existence of the right in those two major legal systems.
27

BROWNLIE, supra note 19, at 3. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 41.]
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right has appeared substantially, uniformly, and consistently in various international
instruments over the last fifty years.28 The foundation of the right can be extracted from
the international instruments and domestic constitutional documents containing the right,
and can be summarized as follows: (1) a person’s home is inviolable, and (2) interference
with that right must be lawful, reasonable and not arbitrary.29
(3) Generality and Empirical Extent: Treaties and Other Instruments as
Evidence of State Practice of the Search and Seizure Privacy Right
Generality complements the uniformity and consistency requirement. Evidence
must be submitted to show that the practice in question is widespread, with minimal
abstention or objection by states.30 Evidence of generality can take the form of the
quantum of treaties and other international instruments that provide for the search and
seizure privacy right.31 The argument that the search and seizure privacy right has risen
to the level of customary international law is bolstered by the inclusion of the right in
numerous international and regional human rights treaties, and by the enforcement of that
right by international and domestic tribunals.32

28

See generally Edwards, supra note 9, at 370-405. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
57.]

29

Id. at 331.

30

BROWNLIE, supra note 19, at 6. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 41.]

31

Edwards, supra note 9, at 392. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 57.]

32

Id.

8

D. International Human Rights Instruments: Interpretations of the Right to Privacy
(1) Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”), which was produced in
1948 to give meaning to the general human rights provision of the 1945 U.N. Charter,
applies to all members of the United Nations.33 The rights expressed in the UDHR have
been invoked, frequently verbatim, in many United Nations, regional, and bilateral
human rights treaties, and in national legislation and many world constitutions.34
Article 12 of the UDHR provides for privacy rights as follows: “No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor
to attacks upon his honor and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the
law against such interference or attacks.”35 This provision, which was the first modern
international illustration of the search and seizure privacy right, is echoed in the ICCPR,
and many other international and regional human rights instruments.36
(2) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”),37 which was
adopted by the United Nations in 1966 to render UDHR rights enforceable, came into

33

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 12, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948)
(stating “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence”). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 5.]

34

Edwards, supra note 9, at 393. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 57.]

35

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 33, art. 12. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 5.]

36

Edwards, supra note 9, at 393. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 57.]

37

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 17, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M.
368 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (stating “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence”). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 6.]
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force in 1976, and currently binds 144 State Parties that have adhered to it.38 In addition,
rights contained in the ICCPR have risen to the level of customary international law, and
thus binds all States, including those that have not ratified the treaty.39
Article 17 of the ICCPR provides: (1) no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or
unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, or to unlawful
attacks on his honor and reputation; (2) everyone has the right to the protection of the law
against such interference or attacks.
(a) Human Rights Committee General Comment on Article 17
Pursuant to article 28 of the ICCPR, a committee of independent experts, known
as the Human Rights Committee,40 was formed to oversee implementation of the ICCPR
within State Parties to that treaty.41 Pursuant to ICCPR article 40(4), the Human Rights
Committee may issue “general comments,” which are distributed to States Parties,42 and
which are deemed to be “authoritative interpretations” of the relevant parts of the ICCPR
that the particular comments address.43 The Human Rights Committee issued a General

38

United Nations Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General,
http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (updated Dec. 9, 2002). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at Tab 65.]
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M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying International
Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L.
235, 249 (1993). (stating “When a significant number of states representing the major legal systems of the
world have adhered to a given convention, it may become part of customary international law. . .and
therefore become binding upon nonsignatory states under Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice”). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 59.]
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 37, art.28. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 6.]
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Id., art. 40 (calling on ICCPR State Parties to submit periodic reports to the Human Rights Committee on
implementation of ICCPR rights in their territories).
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Id., art. 40(4).
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Edwards, supra note 9, at 394. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 57.]
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Comment on ICCPR article 17,44 which focuses additionally on the “right to respect of
privacy, family, home and correspondence.”45 The General Comment on Article 17
(“General Comment”) gives an outline of how the ICCPR search and seizure requirement
should be interpreted.
The first instance of clarification contained in the General Comment, is the
explanation of the term “home” found in article 17. The General Comment says that
“home” is to be given a broad meaning and includes not only a place where a person
resides, but also where the person works.46 The General Comment specifically states:
“The term ‘home’ in English, ‘manzel’ in Arabic, ‘zhuzhai’ in Chinese, ‘domicile’ in
French, ‘zhilishche’ in Russian, and ‘domicilio’ in Spanish, as used in article 17 of the
[ICCPR], is understood to indicate where a person resides or carries out his usual
occupation.”47
The second point of clarification is that though the ICCPR does not expressly
place limitations on the privacy right through its language, the General Comment
concludes that privacy rights are not absolute.48
The third point of clarification found in the General Comment is the explanation
of the term “unlawful”:49 “The term ‘unlawful’ means that no interference can take place
44

General Comment, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 43rd Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 181, U.N. Doc. A/43/40
(1988) (discussing the meaning and ramifications of certain terms in ICCPR, article 17). [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 7.]
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Id. ¶ 5.
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Id.
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Id. ¶¶ 7-9 (stating “As all persons live in society, the protection of privacy is necessarily relative … Even
with regard to interferences that conform to the [ICCPR], relevant legislation must specify in detail the
precise circumstances in which such inferences may be permitted … State parties are under a duty
themselves not to engage in interferences inconsistent with article 17”).
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except in cases envisaged by law. Interference authorized by States can only take place
on the basis of law, which itself must comply with the provisions, aims and objectives of
the Covenant.”50
The fourth and last point of clarification is the explanation of the term “arbitrary
interference.” The General Comment defines the term “arbitrary interference” as an
expression that can “extend to interference provided for under the law,” and “[t]he
introduction of the concept of arbitrariness is intended to guarantee that even interference
provided for by law should be in accordance with the provisions, aims and objectives of
the [ICCPR] and should be, in any event, reasonable in the particular circumstances.”51
It can be concluded that the Human Rights Committee recognizes the existence of
a search and seizure privacy right.52 The right requires that State Parties adopt legislative
and other measures to prohibit interference with privacy rights related to the home or
business, that no interference to the privacy of home or business should occur unless
foreseen by law, and that the national law and any interference with the right must be in
accordance with the ICCPR.53

49

Id. ¶ 3.

50

Id.

51

Id. ¶ 4 (noting that “[s]earches of a person’s home should be restricted”).

52

Id. ¶ 8.
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Edwards, supra note 9, at 395. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 57.]
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E. Regional International Human Rights Law Systems and Instruments
(1) The European Human Rights System
The 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention)54 has been ratified by many European
nations and provides for a search and seizure privacy right. Article 8(1) provides:
“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence.”55
The European Convention is governed by decisions of the European Court of
Human Rights. The European Court of Human Rights has ruled that the right to privacy
in the home is inviolable, and has defined parameters of the right.56 In Huvig v. France,57
the European Court recognized the right to privacy in the criminal procedure context as it
applied article 8 of the European Convention to a search (telephone tap) and seizure (the
tapped conversation) pursuant to a search warrant in France. Huvig involved a French
couple under investigation for tax evasion. A French judge issued a warrant calling for
monitoring and transcription of the couple’s telephone conversations. The monitoring
spanned twenty-eight hours over two days. The couple challenged the telephone taps
before the European Commission, which held that the phone taps violated article 8.58

54

European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 222,
1953. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 8.]
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Id.
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The European Court has ruled that the right to privacy of the “home” extends to “business premises.”
Niemietz v. Germany, 251 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1992) (discussing that respect for private life must
encompass the right to develop relationships with others, including relations of a business or professional
nature). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 18.]
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Huvig v. France, 176-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1990). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 19.]
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Id.
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The European Court applied a two-step process in the Huvig case. First, the Court
determined whether the alleged interference with article 8 rights was “in accordance with
law,” and second, the Court examined the permissible limitations or restrictions on the
right to privacy contained in article 8(1). The Court found that though the warrant issued
was authorized by law, article 8 was violated as the contested French law permitted the
police too much discretion to determine the scope of the interference.59
In Cremieux v. France,60 the European Court again found a breach of the article 8
search and seizure privacy right. Over three years, pursuant to the French Customs Code,
government officials conducted eighty-three investigative searches of Mr. Cremieux’s
home, office, and other locations, and seized papers sought to be used in criminal
proceedings against Mr. Cremieux. The court noted the French government’s concession
“that there had been an interference with Mr. Cremieux’s right to respect for his private
life” and acknowledged the European’s Commission’s earlier finding that “there had
been an interference Mr. Cremieux’s right to respect for his home.”61 The court then
turned to article 8(2), which details limitations on the rights articulated in article 8(1).
Under article 8(2), the court examined whether the interference under article 8(1) was “in
accordance with the law” as required by article 8(2), and found it unnecessary to answer
that question as the interference complained of was “incompatible with Article 8 in other
respects.”62 The court found that the interference was in furtherance of legitimate

59

Id.

60

Cremieux v. France, 256-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 20.]
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Id. at 373.
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Id. at 357.
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government interests in “the economic well-being of the country.”63 However, the court
still found a breach of article 8 because “in the absence of any requirement of a judicial
warrant the restrictions and conditions provided for in law…appear too lax and full of
loopholes for the interferences with Mr. Cremieux’s rights to have been strictly
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.” Such searches might be permissible for
prosecutorial purposes, but they could only be conducted in accordance with the French
Constitution. Article 66 of the French Constitution renders the judiciary responsible for
protecting the liberty of the individual regarding the inviolability of the home.64 The
court went further to add that legislation and procedures governing searches and seizures
must afford “adequate and effective safeguards against abuse.”65
(2) The Inter-American Human Rights System
The Americas also have protections for a person’s right to privacy. The regional
system is based primarily on three instruments: the Charter of the Organization of
American States;66 the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man;67 and the
American Convention on Human Rights.68 Both the American Declaration and the
American Convention contain provisions protecting the right to privacy. Article IX of
63

Id. at 358.
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Id. at 376.

65

Id. at 358.
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Charter of the Organization of American States, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 9.]
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American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man , O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth
International Conference of American States (1948), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human
Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 17 (1992). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]

68

American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, OEA/Ser. L/V/II.23 doc. rev. 2, 1978.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11.]
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the American Declaration provides that “every person has the right to the inviolability of
his home,”69 and article X provides that “every person has the right to the inviolability
and transmission of his correspondence.”70 The American Convention was promulgated
subsequent to the American Declaration to give binding force to the rights contained in
the declaration. Article 11 of the American Convention71 provides:
Every person has the right to have his honor respected and his dignity
recognized; No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference
with his private life, his family, his home, or his correspondence, or of
unlawful attacks on his honor or reputation; Everyone has the right to the
protection of the law against such interference or attacks.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has addressed search and
seizure privacy rights issues. In Garcia v. Peru,72 it was alleged that on April 5, 1992,
the date on which Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori announced to the public that he
had suspended the constitution, soldiers, with no search warrant, forcibly entered the
home of former Peruvian President Dr. Alan Garcia Perez, held his family under house
arrest for several days, and seized some of his private family papers.73 The Commission
recognized the existence of the right to privacy and the inviolability of the home, but also
acknowledged limitations, in that privacy must “give way” in the face of a well69

American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man , O.A.S. Res. XXX, Article IX, adopted by the
Ninth International Conference of American States (1948), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to
Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 17 (1992). [Reproduced in
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Ninth International Conference of American States (1948), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to
Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 17 (1992). [Reproduced in
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Garcia v. Peru, Report No. 1/95, Case 11.0006, Inter-Amer. Cm.H.R. 71, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.88, Doc. 9 rev.
(1995). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21.]
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substantiated search warrant issued by a competent judicial authority, specifying the
reasons for the measure being adopted, the place to be searched, and the objects to be
seized.74 The 1979 constitution of Peru provides that homes and private papers shall be
inviolable except “when an order has been issued by a competent judicial authority
authorizing the search, explaining its reasons and, where appropriate, authorizing the
seizure of private papers, while respecting the guarantees stipulated by law,” but no
warrant was issued in this case. The Commission found a violation of the right to the
inviolability of the home.75
Also, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights found a violation of the
right to privacy in the case of Ms. X and Y v. Argentina,76 in which the complainants
(mother and daughter) contended that their right to privacy was violated by body-cavity
searches, to which the complainants were subjected when they visited their husband and
father in an Argentine prison. The Commission ruled that article 11 of the InterAmerican Convention protects the physical and moral integrity of the person and
specifically that article 11(2) prohibits “arbitrary or abusive interference” with a person’s
private life.77
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Id.
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Id.
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Ms. X and Y v. Argentina, 81st Sess. Annual Report 1996, Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, Washington, D.C., Mar. 14, 1997, Case 10.506, Rep. No. 38/96 (1997). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 22.]
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F. States Internal Law as Evidence of State Practice: Constitutions of the World
Safeguarding the search and seizure right is not a Western Concept, but a concept
that reflects laws in place in every corner of the globe, regardless of the countries’
respective regions or political or economic systems.”78 Additionally, according to
Edwards, almost all of the constitutions of the world safeguard the right to privacy in the
home. Some constitutions generally forbid arbitrary or unlawful entries, while other
countries have adopted an “unreasonableness” model based on the Fourth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution.79
The following general principles can be drawn about the search and seizure right
to privacy from constitutions of the World: a respect for the sanctity and inviolability of
the home; acceptable limitations on the right, rendering the right not absolute; recognition
that any interference with the right must be reasonable and limited to the scope necessary
to satisfy a legal purpose; rejection of arbitrary and unlawful interference with privacy
and unfettered discretion to search or seize; effective external supervision of law
enforcement authorities; balance of prevention and detection of crime versus the right to
privacy; call for supervision by judicially independent persons before a search or seizure,
and not after; and legally enforceable safeguards regulating use of police powers.80

78

Edwards, supra note 9, at 401. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 57.]
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Id. at 404.
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Id. at 405.
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IV. Different Approaches of Varying Legal Systems
A. International Criminal Statutes
(1) The ICTY Statute
The ICTY, in the case of Prosecutor v. Mucic,81 addressed the issue of whether an
accused person is to be given search and seizure privacy rights. In that case, the accused
were charged with perpetrating international crimes in Celebici, in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. One of the accused persons, Mr. Mucic, had moved to Austria. ICTY
Prosecutors had requested that Austrian authorities search for evidence related to the
alleged crimes. Austrian authorities, upon a warrant issued by an Austrian court,
searched Mr. Mucic’s Vienna apartment and seized incriminating evidence, including
various travel documents, which they sought to use against him at trial. Though
conceding that “a number of irregularities” occurred in the search of Mr. Mucic’s
apartment and that “actions were taken” that violated Austrian law,82 the prosecution
contended that the search itself was lawful.
Judge Karibi-Whyte stated in the Mucic case that its rules provide a “liberal and
less technical rule relating to the admissibility of evidence,”83 and that the court would
adhere to the general rule contained in the ICTY Rule 89(c)84 that calls for the admission

81

Prosecutor v. Mucic, Case No. IT-96-21, Decision on the Tendering of Prosecution Exhibits 104-108
(1998). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 23.]
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Rules of Procedure and Evidence as Amended 30 January 1995, International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed
in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991, Rule 89(c), 5th Sess., U.N. Doc. IT/32 Rev.3/Corr.1
(1995) (stating “A Chamber may admit any relevant evidence which it deems to have probative value”).
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of any evidence that is relevant and has probative value. However, the court stated that it
“reserves the right to exercise its discretion to exclude any evidence admitted if it is
satisfied that it was obtained by means contrary to internationally protected human
rights.”85 Though the trial chamber admitted the evidence that had been seized in a
manner contrary to Austrian law,86 Judge Karibi-Whyte confirmed that accused persons
shall be afforded the search and seizure right to privacy, and that it is appropriate for the
trial chamber to determine whether that right had been violated.
(2) The ICTR Statute
The ICTR recently faced a search and seizure privacy issue involving the
prosecution of genocide suspect Mr. Jerome Bicamumpaka, former Rwandan Minister of
Foreign Affairs.87 In April 1999, he was arrested in Cameroon on charges that he used
his position to organize and perpetrate massacres against the Tutsi minority in Rwanda
during the 1994 genocide. During the arrest, certain documents belonging to him were
seized by Cameroonian authorities. Though the documents were not turned over to the
prosecution and were not used against him in his ICTR prosecution, the existence of
search and seizure privacy rights was arguably reaffirmed. In March 2000, the ICTR
ruled, inter alia, that the accused person had waived his search and seizure rights during
the seizure.88
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B. Common Law Jurisdictions
(1) The United States
The exclusion of evidence in the United States is based upon the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.89
The Fourth Amendment is a result of offensive British practices prior to the American
Revolution.90 It was written into the fundamental law of the land by the drafters of the
Constitution, who hoped to assure that the government would respect the sanctity,
dignity, and privacy of its citizens.91
For more than a century, the Fourth Amendment was rarely cited by the Courts.
Except for Boyd v. United States,92 virtually no search and seizure cases were decided by
the United States Supreme Court in the first 110 years of the existence of the United
States under its constitution.93 Until 1914, the rule in American courts was the same as it
89

U.S. CONST. amend. IV. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 4.]
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GEOFFREY R. STONE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 1 (1988). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
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Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (discussing that the Supreme Court held that to seize
personal papers violated the Fourth Amendment and that to use them as evidence violated the Fifth
Amendment) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 25.] NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY
AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 136 (1937) (to
compel a person in a criminal case to furnish documents to be used against himself accomplishes the
purpose of a search and seizure and violates the Fourth Amendment as to unreasonable searches and
seizures and the Fifth Amendment as to compulsory self-incrimination). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 43.]
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ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A DILEMMA OF THE SUPREME COURT 2 (1975).
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still is in British courts; the illegality of a search and seizure is irrelevant to the question
of whether its fruits were admissible as evidence in a criminal trial.94 In 1914, however,
the Supreme Court decided Weeks v. United States.95 In the Weeks case, The Supreme
Court held for the first time that a violation of the Fourth Amendment by itself could
justify the exclusion of evidence.96
The exclusionary rule is a rule of evidence which excludes, or renders
inadmissible in a criminal proceeding, evidence that is illegally obtained by law
enforcement officials.97 Thus, evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure could
not, under present Supreme Court holdings, be considered admissible in any criminal
prosecution.98 It makes no difference whether the evidence was secured in a legally
debatable search – one which produces close and split opinions in appellate courts – or in
a blatant and willful violation of the law by police. All police procedures judged to be
illegal by the courts or legislatures must be excluded.99
The most radical extension of the exclusionary rule took place in 1961 in Mapp v.
Ohio.100 In that case, the Supreme Court applied the exclusionary rule not only to federal
94

BRADFORD P. WILSON, EXCLUSIONARY RULE 2 (1988) (discussing how the courts relied upon common
law, which regarded unlawful police behavior violating a person’s privacy and property as a form of
trespass against that individual). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 45.]
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Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (this case involved the seizure of personal papers and
effects, including letters, from a man’s home without a search warrant). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 26.]
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courts, as it had done in 1914 in Weeks, but also to State courts.101 By this time, the
Supreme Court felt that the Fourth Amendment was applicable to states through the
Fourteenth Amendment102 of the United States’ constitution.103
(a) Justifications for the United States’ Exclusionary Rule
There are three basic arguments in favor of the exclusionary rule: (1) the rule
protects a constitutional “right to privacy”; (2) the rule upholds the integrity of the
judiciary by precluding judicial acquiescence in denial of an individual’s Fourth
Amendment rights; (3) the rule deters police misconduct by forbidding the use of
improperly acquired evidence.104 At some point, all of these arguments have been used
by the Supreme Court.
In Mapp v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule is an
“essential part of the right to privacy.”105 The court further held that the right to
protection of privacy and dignity can implicitly be found in the language of the Fourth,
Fifth,106 and Fourteenth amendments. Under this notion, the exclusionary rule is used as
a remedy for the unlawful invasion of a person’s right to privacy and dignity secured by
the Fourth Amendment. Also under this concept, it is constitutionally required in order to
101

JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 70 (1976). The Weeks case ordered the exclusion of evidence seized by the federal
marshal; however, the court left a wide crack in the exclusionary wall when it allowed the use of evidence
seized by the local police before the marshal arrived on the scene. In other words, the rule was to apply
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U.S. CONST. amend. V. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14.]
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prevent any additional invasion of privacy and dignity due to the use of
unconstitutionally seized evidence in a criminal proceeding against the victim of an
illegal search. To the adherents of this view, “an attack on the exclusionary rule is an
attack on the Fourth Amendment itself.”107
The second justification for the exclusionary rule is that it is needed to maintain
the integrity of the judicial branch of government.108 This argument is not based on the
Fourth Amendment. Instead, it is based on the moral integrity of the administration of
justice. Supreme Court Justice Brandeis stated in a dissenting opinion that the exclusion
of illegally seized evidence “preserves the judicial process from contamination.”109
Brandeis’s contention is that if courts allow people to be convicted on the basis of
illegally obtained evidence, then they would become accomplices to an illegal act.
Further, the argument is that courts would be teaching disobedience to the law by
ignoring the purpose of the Fourth Amendment.
The third and final argument for the exclusionary rule is that it deters law
enforcement from conducting illegal searches and seizures.110 The Supreme Court has
relied on this notion for the past forty years when defending the use of the exclusionary
rule. The Supreme Court however, does not use this rationale based on the right to
privacy argument. In Linkletter v. Walker,111 the Supreme Court held that the
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exclusionary rule did not have anything to do with the right of the privacy of the victim
of an illegal search. The Court stated that “the ruptured privacy of the victims’ homes
and effects cannot be restored” by means of the exclusionary rule.112 “Reparation comes
too late.”113 Writing for the majority, Justice Clark, the author of the Mapp opinion,
made the point that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty by removing the incentive to disregard it.114 Since Linkletter, the
Supreme Court has reaffirmed that the “prime purpose” of the exclusionary rule is to
deter unlawful police conduct, rather than “to redress the injury to the privacy of the
search victim.”115
(b) Criticisms of the United States’ Exclusionary Rule
There are three basic arguments against the use of the exclusionary rule: (1) the
rule is not an effective deterrent of unlawful searches and seizures; (2) the rule is morally
bankrupt and corrupts the administration of justice; and (3) the rule does not rest on the
U.S. Constitution and is therefore beyond the constitutional authority of the courts to
invent.116
The first example of a criticism of the rule is that the deterrence rationale for the
exclusionary rule does not work. Six of seven empirical studies of the rule’s
effectiveness have concluded that the rule has little or no value in deterring police
112
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misconduct.117 In United States v. Janis, the Supreme Court itself stated that it has “acted
in the absence of convincing empirical evidence and relied, instead, on its own
assumptions of human nature and the interrelationship of the various components of the
law enforcement system.”118 Many observers of law enforcement have noted, however,
that arrests rather than convictions are the primary measure of success of police work.119
According to its critics, then, the exclusionary rule is well tailored to affect the life of the
judge, the prosecutor, and the criminal defendant, but it has no real effect when it comes
to disciplining the police.120
The second criticism of the exclusionary rule is that it is unjust not to use reliable
incriminating evidence just because of the manner in which it was obtained.121 Justice
Benjamin Cardozo once stated “the criminal is to go free because the constable has
blundered.”122 The argument made by critics of the exclusionary rule to back up
Cardozo’s sentiment is this: Rules of criminal procedure are meant to provide for
conviction and punishment of the guilty while protecting the innocent.123 If two offenses
have been committed – one by the defendant and one by the police officer – then both
should be punished.124 The exclusionary rule departs from the truth-finding process of a
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trial by suppressing proof of guilt, and it does nothing to punish the police officer who
broke the law.125 Thus criminals often walk free while justice goes unserved.126
The third criticism of the exclusionary rule is that it is the Supreme Court’s job to
interpret law, not to make it.127 Under this notion, the Supreme Court should only apply
an exclusionary rule if it is contained in the constitution or if the legislature creates such a
rule. The exclusionary rule, say its constitutional critics, is based neither in the U.S.
Constitution nor in legislation but only in judicial fiat.128 First, the Fourth Amendment is
silent about how it should be enforced. Second, the ideal of judicial integrity is not well
served by a rule that suppresses incriminating evidence; it is in any case an ideal not
firmly rooted in any constitutional provision. Third, deterrence of unlawful police
behavior is the domain of legislative and executive action, not of the judiciary acting as a
legislature.129
(c) Recent Developments of the United States’ Exclusionary Rule
Among the criticisms of the exclusionary rule as an across-the-board response to
all types of Fourth Amendment violations is that it sweeps too widely.130 Honest
mistakes that are made by police officers and that constitute no great injustice to an
individual are met with the same penalty as purposeful and flagrant violations of Fourth

125

Id. at 3.

126

Id. at 3.

127

Id. at 3.

128

WILSON, supra note 94, at 3. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 45.]

129

Id. at 3.

130

Id. at 3.

27

Amendment right — the exclusion of evidence.131 In the cases of United States v. Leon
and Massachusetts v. Sheppard,132 the Supreme Court created a “good faith” exception to
the exclusionary rule. The Court ruled in these cases that evidence obtained by officers
acting with a search warrant issued by a judicial officer should not be excluded if a judge
later finds that the warrant was invalid, provided its invalidity was not obvious to the
police officers. Since most Fourth Amendment violations do not involve defective
warrants, the immediate effect of this ruling on the exclusionary rule is minor.133
Nevertheless, many Supreme Court scholars expect further modifications of the
exclusionary rule as other good-faith circumstances are brought before the courts.134
(2) England
The traditional English approach to the admissibility of illegally obtained nonconfession evidence135 is expressed by Judge Crompton’s statement: “it matters not how
you get it, if you steal it even, it would be admissible.”136 The admissibility of such
evidence is now under the discretion of Section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence
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Act of 1984 (“PACE”),137 which expressly provides for consideration of the manner in
which the evidence was obtained. Section 78 provides:
In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow the evidence on which
the prosecution proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court that,
having regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in
which the evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would
have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the
court ought not to admit it.138
The list of factors a judge would consider Section 78 of PACE include: a review of the
legality of the police actions; the seriousness of the offense; the bad faith of the
investigators;139 the type of evidence and its potential reliability; the existence of other
evidence; the opportunity to challenge the evidence at trial; the type of impropriety
involved; and the type of right or protection infringed.140 Basically, the ultimate Section
78 question is not whether there is a breach of a specific domestic provision or even a
Convention right, but whether the breach will affect the fairness of the proceedings.141
The relationship between Section 78 and the common law is unclear.142 Some
English courts have taken the view that the section simply restates the common law;
others suggest that it should be regarded as stating a new principle.143 The common law
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approach is governed by the House of Lords decision in R. v. Sang.144 The question was:
“Does a trial judge [including magistrates] have a discretion to refuse to admit evidence if
in his opinion its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value?”145 The answer was
given in two parts: (1) A trial judge in a criminal trial always has a discretion to refuse to
admit evidence if in his opinion its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value; (2)
Save with regard to admissions and confessions and generally with regard to evidence
obtained from the accused after the commission of the offense, he has no discretion to
refuse to admit relevant admissible evidence on the ground that it was obtained by
improper or unfair means.146
Some scholars took the view at the time PACE was enacted that, given the courts
historic marked reluctance to exclude improperly obtained evidence, the courts would be
likely to interpret Section 78 narrowly.147 If Section 78 was followed narrowly, hardly
any evidence would be excludable because it would always be possible to postulate
hypothetical circumstances in which the evidence could have been obtained otherwise
than by the impropriety in question.148 What has happened under PACE shows that this
is not the way courts have approached Section 78.149 Between January 1986 and June
1990, there were more than 70 reported decisions in which the exclusion of evidence was
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considered.150 Roughly half of the cases have been decided in favor of the defendant and
half in favor of the prosecution.151
(3) Canada
The common law approach in Canada follows the same principle as the common
law in England. That is, the manner in which evidence is obtained, no matter how
improper or illegal, is not an impediment to its admission at common law.152 The most
significant change from the common law inclusionary rule in Canada is the express
power vested in courts of competent jurisdiction by Section 24(2) of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“Charter”)153 to exclude evidence obtained through a
violation of constitutional rights.154
Section 24 of the Charter reflects its historical background. It is a compromise
between the strict Anglo-Canadian inclusionary rule and the strict American exclusionary
rule.155 Section 24 provides:
(1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by the Charter, have
been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to
obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the
circumstances.
(2) Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court concludes that
evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed or denied rights or
freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is
150

Id.

151

Id.

152

JOHN SOPINKA, SIDNEY N. LEDERMAN, & ALAN W. BRYANT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CANADA 379
(1992). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 52.]

153

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 44 Sched. B, Pt. I s. 24.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 16.]

154

SOPINKA, supra note 152, at 380. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 52.]

155

Id. at 388.

31

established that, having regard to all the circumstances, the admission of it
in the proceeding would bring the administration of justice into dispute.156
In R. v. Collins,157 the Supreme Court of Canada set out the test for excluding
evidence under Section 24(2). The court listed a number of factors to be considered
concerning the Charter violation, including the question “was it deliberate, willful or
flagrant, or was it inadvertent or committed in good faith.”158 It then divided those
factors into three groups: those affecting the fairness of the trial, those relevant to the
seriousness of the violation, and those relating to the effect of excluding the evidence.159
In this formulation of the issues, “good faith” is opposed to “bad faith”: if the
police violate Charter rights deliberately, willfully, or flagrantly, they act in bad faith;
otherwise, they act in good faith.160 Under this interpretation, “good faith” and “bad
faith” fill the field: every police action will be characterized by one or the other.161 In
addition, the vast majority of police actions will properly be described as good faith,
because that term really only means that the police carried out their duties in the ordinary
way; the police will not be required to take extraordinary measures to protect an
accused’s rights in order to have acted in good faith.162
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According to Collins, the ultimate question – whether or not the impugned
evidence should be excluded – is expressed as follows:
The question under Section 24(2) is whether the system’s repute will be
better served by the admission or the exclusion of the evidence, and it is
thus necessary to consider any disrepute that may result from the
exclusion of the evidence. In my view, the administration of justice would
be brought into disrepute by the exclusion of evidence essential to
substantiate the charge, and thus the acquittal of the accused, because of a
trivial breach of the Charter. Such disrepute would be greater if the
offence was more serious.163
The court made it clear that essential evidence should not be excluded for trivial Charter
breaches, which, in itself, might bring the administration of justice into disrepute.164 The
evidence is more likely to be excluded if the offense is less serious.165 The general
consensus of judicial reasoning appears to conclude that there is no rule of automatic
exclusion under Section 24(2).166 The trial judge must make a value judgment in light of
all the circumstances.167 The decision involves discretion exercised under the guidelines
of Section 24(2) and in Collins.168 Ultimately, it involves the application of judicial
wisdom.169
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C. The Civil Jurisdiction of France
The French criminal justice system has many tiers, but trial procedure on all
levels is strongly oriented towards professional judges.170 Protections from searches and
seizures of persons and property come from both France’s constitution and its codes of
criminal procedure.171 These formal rules attempt to guarantee the rights of individuals
against state intrusion.172
The French Constitution has no explicit guarantee of privacy, but its
“Constitutional Court ruled in 1994 that the right of privacy was implicit in the
Constitution.”173 Most of the protection from searches and seizures in France come from
rules of procedure; these French versions of exclusionary rules are called “textual
Nullities.”174 Article 59 requires exclusion, or “nullity,” of evidence procured wrongly in
domicile searches.175 The French impose limits on identity checks and electronic
surveillance as well.176 The French have other, lesser rules guiding criminal searches,
such as a requirement that “most residential searches must be witnessed by a resident or
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by two persons not subject to the administrative authority of the searching official.”177
Unlike the one, broad rule of exclusion in the United States, France relies on these more
specific rules to guide the execution of criminal investigations.178
The laws in France guarantee specific protections of privacy, and in some areas
the statutes are silent as to proper police conduct.179 Courts and the legislature have not
filled the void in these areas with a provision or rule like the United States.180 French
investigations fall into four categories, each with varying powers for the investigator.
These include “(1) investigation of ‘flagrant’ offenses; (2) ‘preliminary’ investigations;
(3) identity checks; and (4) the formal judicial investigation conducted by an examining
magistrate.”181 The investigation of flagrant offenses allows the greatest breadth for
searches and seizures, but none of these four are very restrictive on the search for facts
and truth.182 In each category “there is no general legal requirement of probable cause to
search, arrest, or detain … [and] no general judicial warrant requirement for search or
arrest.”183 Without these probable cause or warrant limitations, the examining magistrate
has almost complete discretion to select places to be searched and things to be seized.184
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In addition to these greater allowances in practice, differences exist in the
enforcement of the limits that do exist.185 In the United States, the rule is explained
through the remedy provided for it. Since French rules of evidence collection are not
generally backed up with an exclusionary sanction like the one the United States
Supreme Court attached to the Fourth Amendment, French investigators have virtually
unregulated power to ignore them.186
The French rules for exclusion reflect more of a concern with propriety than
deterrence of future bad actions by the police or investigating judge.187 Evidence is
generally not excludable unless the violation has caused harm to the interests of the party
that it concerns, or if it affects public interest.188 These interests are not read as broadly
as those implicated in the United States’ Supreme Court decision in Weeks,189 so the
concern is with the harm to the party wronged by the offense.190 This is the opposite of
the United States’ exclusion rule, which is “calculated to prevent, not to repair.”191
Instead of deterring police conduct with the exclusion of evidence, the French rely on
other disincentives, including disciplinary measures against the offending police officer,
prosecutor, or JDI [juge d’instruction]; civil liability of these officials or the government
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itself; and sometimes criminal liability.”192 Deterrence is taken care of elsewhere, so any
French efforts at exclusion are designed to provide justice to the wronged party.193

V. Conclusion and Recommendation
In every form of modern society in the World, there exists some form of
protection of a person’s right to privacy. Along those lines, the governments of these
societies offer some form of protection of a person’s right to privacy. The protection of
this right can be found in the exclusionary rules of these governments. The exclusion of
evidence ensures that a person will not lose their right to privacy at the hands of their
government’s authoritative arm.
It is important that the ICTR gives each accused individual the same right to
privacy, no matter how horrific the crime they are accused of may be. This will ensure
that the ICTR’s decisions will be respected in the international community. In addition,
evidence will probably be very difficult to obtain in many of the cases the ICTR will
face, but the court should not grant leniency when admitting evidence that may have been
obtained by improper methods. The concern should be the sanctity of the Court, not the
difficulty the police authorities had gathering the evidence.
The most broad and strict of all the rules is the American exclusionary rule under
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Under this rule a violation
alone of the Fourth Amendment is enough to justify the exclusion of evidence. This type
of rule is probably too strict for the ICTR. On the opposite end of the spectrum is
France’s approach to the exclusion of evidence. This is also probably not a good system
192

King, supra note 170, at 224. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 62.]

193

Id.

37

for the ICTR to adopt because this type of system does little to guarantee the privacy
rights of the accused. England’s approach to the exclusion of evidence works fairly in
their court system; however the language used in Section 78 of PACE194 could be viewed
too narrowly by the ICTR if it incorporated a similar approach and would thus not ensure
the privacy rights of the accused. The approach to the exclusion of evidence in Canada
seems to be a good fit for the ICTR. This system is concerned with the Court’s
reputation and allows the trial judge to apply judicial wisdom as to whether the exclusion
of evidence is necessary based upon the conduct of the police authority. If the ICTR
adopts this type of rule, it can be assured that the decision of whether or not to exclude
evidence will be fairly evaluated by the ICTR’s judges in light of all circumstances
affecting each individual case. There is no perfect system for the exclusion of evidence,
but adopting a similar approach to the Canadian system should work well for the ICTR.
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